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Proceedings of the Annual Acquisition Research Program 
The following article is taken as an excerpt from the proceedings of the annual 
Acquisition Research Program.  This annual event showcases the research projects 
funded through the Acquisition Research Program at the Graduate School of Business 
and Public Policy at the Naval Postgraduate School.  Featuring keynote speakers, 
plenary panels, multiple panel sessions, a student research poster show and social 
events, the Annual Acquisition Research Symposium offers a candid environment 
where high-ranking Department of Defense (DoD) officials, industry officials, 
accomplished faculty and military students are encouraged to collaborate on finding 
applicable solutions to the challenges facing acquisition policies and processes within 
the DoD today.  By jointly and publicly questioning the norms of industry and academia, 
the resulting research benefits from myriad perspectives and collaborations which can 
identify better solutions and practices in acquisition, contract, financial, logistics and 
program management. 
For further information regarding the Acquisition Research Program, electronic 
copies of additional research, or to learn more about becoming a sponsor, please visit 
our program website at: 
www.acquistionresearch.org  
For further information on or to register for the next Acquisition Research 
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Incentive Arrangements for Space Acquisitions 




Disclaimer: The views represented in this report are those of the author and do not reflect the official 
policy position of the US Air Force, the Department of Defense, or the Federal Government. 
Space Systems acquisition has experienced a paradigm shift in its approach 
toward the use of contract incentives. This shift in the use of incentives is a matter of 
tremendous importance to those who develop and buy major Space Systems, but, more 
importantly, to the industry partners that deal with the Space & Missile Systems Center. 
This shift began under the Bush Administration and, based upon initial signs, may 
accelerate under the Obama Administration. 
What are some of these changes, and what will be the impact of revising the 
government’s business strategy? In order to get some perspective on the reasons for 
the changes, it is necessary to understand the history of the use of incentives in the 
acquisition of major systems by the DoD. 
How does the DoD incentivize contractors to perform this important job?  What 
do they use to motivate performance, and how do they monitor that performance to 
ensure that this fee is truly earned?  
In the acquisition business, we face these questions on almost a daily basis.  We 
get them from the media.  We get them from the Congress.  We get them from the 
senior leadership within the Executive Branch, right up to and including the President of 
the United States. 
Why can’t we get answers to these questions? To some degree, it is because 
incentives are a part of human nature, and their effectiveness is somewhat relative. We 
use them in daily life to varying degrees of success. Would your son or daughter do 
their homework every night if you provided no incentive?  What form of incentive works 
more effectively: positive or negative? How do we know?  Some would work, some 
would not.  It seems intuitive that people respond to stimuli, both in positive and 
negative forms. 
If that is the case, then why is there even a question as to whether incentives 
motivate performance?  Perhaps the more important question goes to the effectiveness 
of the incentive applied. If we read the GAO Report entitled DOD Has Paid Billions in 
Award and Incentive Fees Regardless of Acquisition Outcomes (2005, December), the 
GAO does not believe the Department of Defense uses incentive arrangements very 
effectively.    
The discussion must depend upon the definition of effectiveness.  There is a 
difference as to the relative importance of cost, schedule and technical elements of 
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incentive arrangements to those assessing the performance of the Program Offices that 
are responsible for the acquisition of these systems.  Program Managers have tended 
to view technical performance and mission success as the more important criteria, while 
Congress looks at cost and schedule for validation on a program’s success or failure. 
On the other hand, the user wants it when he needs it and wants it to work. 
The beauty of the DoD acquisition process is both in its simplicity and its 
complexity. The President has articulated his vision of the federal contracting process 
and has stated his goals, which are consistent with the regulatory directions found in the 
Federal Acquisition Regulation.  There should be a preference for fixed-price contracts; 
cost overruns are never a good thing, and profit should be tied in some manner to 
successful outcomes. 
The simplicity of those thoughts articulated in his Executive Order (2009) 
becomes complicated in their application to major defense programs—especially major 
space systems development, which has enormous complexity and technical challenges. 
Many of these systems require pushing the state-of-the-art well beyond previous 
capabilities and into areas that have not been attempted in the past. 
Why has this issue become so important? To some extent, it has always been a 
matter of pressing urgency, but recent economic circumstances have made our ability to 
get more “bang for the buck” a national emergency. One way to add to the capabilities 
of the warfighters, while reducing the dollars required supporting them, is to more 
effectively manage the money expended in the procurement of major systems. This 
may be accomplished through a more effective use of incentive techniques. 
The GAO Report (2005, December) focused attention on the problems that the 
DoD has had in using award and incentive fees in the development and production of 
major systems. It was highly critical of the use of award and incentive arrangements and 
recommended a number of changes to the use of award-fee contracts. 
This Report was followed by a number of policy directives issued from the OSD, 
the Secretary of the Air Force, Major Air Force Commands and respective Buying 
Organizations and Program Offices. This article will focus on the impact that the GAO 
2005 Report has had on the way that the Air Force, and most specifically, the Space & 
Missile Systems Center, has addressed contracting concerns. 
After receiving direction to implement several of the recommendations of the 
GAO Report from AT&L and SAF, the PEO for Space (General Hamel) issued a policy 
directive implementing a series of changes and mandating the development of an 
Incentives Guide.  A follow-on initiative by the SMC Commander was that a course on 
incentives would be created to train the SMC workforce on the theory of Incentive 
Contracting. 
In the Air Force, there had been a preference for the use of award-fee contracts 
for a period of 15-20 years. Acquisition Plans would not be approved without the use of 
award fee as the primary incentive arrangement.  This dependency upon award fee was 
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predicated upon two basic theories: first, that fee has a significant ability to influence 
performance on the part of a contractor, and second, that award fee can be used to 
leverage performance immediately. The decision of the Fee Determining Official was 
not initially deemed to be subject to the “Disputes” remedies, so it gave significant 
leverage to the Program Manager, as Fee Determining Official, over the behavior and 
performance of the contractor. 
Why was this so important?  Well, in conjunction with the normal budgetary 
turbulence associated with the acquisition of a program worth billions of dollars, the era 
of acquisition reform had turned over responsibility for development to the contractors, 
often through the use of an approach known as Total System Performance (or Program) 
Responsibility (TSPR).  TSPR was a natural outgrowth of several factors, not the least 
of which was the “Peace Dividend” and the resultant reduction in the DoD workforce. In 
order to save dollars, the concept of TSPR allowed the government to eliminate many of 
the positions that were linked to the “Oversight” of contractor performance.  It also 
eliminated the need for many of the “overly demanding” specifications and standards 
that industry had suggested for many years were not necessary and were overly 
burdensome. 
The concept of “Insight not Oversight” was a mantra that was repeated almost as 
a solution to all of the problems that were associated with the development of major 
DoD systems.  Unfortunately, it became apparent that without this oversight, many of 
the processes that had contributed to the technical successes were no longer utilized. 
The initial reports on systems such as SBIRS were overly optimistic and did not 
recognize the problems that were being experienced until hundreds of millions of 
overrun dollars had been incurred. 
The incentive structure (award fee) was designed to give the government the 
opportunity to monitor performance and to provide direction, especially to those 
programs experiencing cost, schedule and technical problems.  The Award Fee Review 
Board would evaluate performance against the Award Fee Plan and distribute each 
award fee based upon the contractor’s performance.  The GAO Report (2005, 
December) indicated that this approach did not always result in successful acquisition 
outcomes as anticipated. 
Accordingly, under a “Back to the Basics” approach, there has been a move 
away from the CPAF paradigm. The shift in approach has taken SMC to a slightly 
different strategy.  There is now an emphasis upon ensuring successful outcomes 
though the use of more mission-success initiatives and of more objective criteria both in 
CPIF arrangements and when appropriate, within the Award Fee itself. 
To facilitate this shift, the Incentive Guide was published March 2007, and the 
first Incentives course was held in November 2008.  The basics of incentive contracting 
has not changed; the emphasis on utilizing the correct strategy for each acquisition is 
now a mandatory requirement for all Acquisition Strategy Plans.  Leadership now 
requires a cogent use of a number of incentive techniques when managers are 
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formulating the strategy for the development of major systems.  File documentation 
reflects the degree of analysis that was used in formulating the incentives approach. 
So what is the change? The change will most likely be one of emphasis.  This 
emphasis has manifested itself in several ways, the first of which highlights the nature of 
the relationship between the government and the contractor. Since the onset of the 
Acquisition Reform period, the concept of teaming has been the norm.  The Integrated 
Program Team demonstrates the concept as a practice, with the members of the team 
working toward a common end: delivery of the system. 
The focus on Incentive arrangements is now one of accountability and outcome-
based arrangements.  How will this translate into contract language?  It is likely there 
will be a shift in the payment of incentives; they may become more back-loaded, giving 
the government the opportunity to see what the outcome will be prior to payment of 
much of the fee.  A second possibility would be a form of payback in which fee already 
paid will be tied to the eventual successful demonstration of the program.  This 
approach has been used in the past, most notably by NASA to varying degrees of 
success.  It does cause some accounting issues for contractors in the manner in which 
they are able to book profit. 
Other areas that are under consideration include the use of negative incentives.  
These may be used to offset positive incentives such as on-orbit satellite incentives.  
We have used these in the past, and the results have been mixed.  Most of the satellite 
systems have exceeded their life expectancy, but that begs the question as to how 
reasonable were the initial requirements against which the incentives were based? 
The most apparent consequence of the shift in policy is that there will be some 
difficulty in getting approval for the use of CPAF-type arrangements with subjective 
criteria.  This, in itself, is not a bad thing.  It is reasonable to challenge any approach 
that does not use a firm-fixed-price type of contract. The FAR requires it.  In the arena 
of major space systems, there can be a broad spectrum of contract types and incentives 
that should be considered before deciding upon a specific type. 
These include the cost-plus-award-fee type of contract. It may certainly be 
reasonable to advocate this type of arrangement for the development of high-risk/ high-
reward type of programs.  The supporting rationale should stand up to close scrutiny by 
reviewing bodies.   In some cases, we have been able to find more objective criteria that 
can be used to show that performance has been accomplished; such data contribute to 
supporting the desire for outcome-based incentive expectations. 
There has also been a shift in the approach to the development process in two 
ways: first, a return to the basics—including a more vibrant systems engineering 
process, a more diligent cost-estimating approach and more oversight on the contractor.  
In conjunction with these changes, we will be tying the earning of fee to cost, schedule 
and performance criteria, in part through a more robust earned value system. One fault 
in the acquisition reform process is the lack of visibility into performance that had been 
available to the government through the Cost Schedule Control System Criteria 
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(CSCSC) prior to the reform period.  Earned Value is a high-emphasis program for 
tracking contractor performance, and incentives may be tied more closely to this system 
in the future.  The caveat to this approach is the potential for gaming by the contractor, 
a fix for which could be the payback mentioned earlier. 
Another initiative that has been implemented is the use of Block upgrades.  This 
is a form of evolutionary acquisition in which higher-risk technology is not incorporated 
into the system until it has been demonstrated through the use of risk-reduction efforts 
phased into the system in later iterations.  This may impact incentives, as it should 
reduce the program risk from a technical standpoint and allow for better cost and 
schedule predictability.  This reduced risk should allow for a high confidence in 
predicting contract parameters and may allow for different incentive structures. 
So what else lies ahead for contract incentives?  It seems likely that more 
accountability will be incorporated into new incentive arrangements. There will be some 
pressure to use more fixed-price arrangements.  The use of negative incentives will be 
more prevalent.  Consistent with recent legislation, there will be a push to define what 
constitutes minimum performance against which no fee will be earned.  If award fee is 
used, objective criteria should be developed.  Performance-based work statements 
should help define the criteria against which fee may be evaluated and paid. 
This brings about a question as to incentives for a service-type activity. There 
has been a great deal written concerning the appropriate use of incentives (most 
notably contract type) for major systems.  There has been less written with regard to the 
use of incentives for service-type effort.  Space systems have historically been oriented 
toward supply type of deliverable end-items.  We launched space vehicles that were 
delivered as hardware (Atlas, Titan, and Delta) and accepted delivery of these rockets.  
Now, we are launching via service-type contracts, buying a delivery of a satellite into an 
orbit. 
As the DoD shifts from supplies to services, it becomes even more important to 
define incentives for these services.  We have found that future business opportunities 
are at least as important as fee to these types of arrangements. 
But the key question is how will the new Administration put its stamp on the 
incentives process?  As the new leadership assumes its role, we are certain to find out 
more, but it is safe to bet that there will be some change in the near future.  The 
fundamental philosophy will remain the same: a quality product, delivered on time, for a 
reasonable profit.  The devil will be in the details. 
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